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(Myanmar)
David Schmahmann
James Finch*
ABSTRACT

As a punitive measure against the military regime in
Burma, state and municipal governments in the United States
have adopted laws penalizingfirms that conduct business in
that nation. This Article analyzes the validity of these
statutes and ordinances under various provisions of the U.S.
Constitution.
After introducing the nature of this development and the
constitutionalissues raised, Part1I of this Article proceeds to
examine the character of the local enactments and the
political backdrop which lead to their adoption. In Part1I, the
Authors analyze four federal constitutional issues
surrounding the local legislation: implied preemption by
federal legislation, impermissible intrusion into federal
jurisdiction under the
Foreign Commerce
Clause,
impermissible usurpation of federal authority under the
Supremacy Clause, and impermissible delegation of authority
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resident partner in Yangon. David Schmahmann is a graduate of Dartmouth
College and Cornell Law School, and a partner in the Boston, Massachusetts law
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176

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 30:175

to private parties in violation of the the Due Process Clause.
In Part IV, the Authors discuss the practical problems
presented by parallel and inconsistentforeign policies. This
Article concludes that while the local measures are
constitutionally infirm, they are unlikely to be challenged by
injuredfirms.
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I. INTRODUCTION

By the end of 1996, one state and eight cities 2 in the United
States had adopted measures seeking to penalize business
entities conducting activities in Burma (Myanmar).3 These local

1.
Massachusetts. See Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, § 1, 1996 Mass.
Acts 210.
2.
Berkeley, Santa Monica, San Francisco, and Oakland, CA; Takoma
Park, MD; Ann Arbor, MI; Carborro, NC; and Madison, WI. In addition, the cities
of Seattle, WA, Chicago, IL, and Santa Cruz, CA have adopted measures
expressing their disapproval of the Burmese regime. As of December, 1996,
several other cities, including New York City, were reportedly considering similar
measures. See, e.g.. Paul Reines, Takoma Park Takes Global View with BurmaRelated Ban, WASH. TIMES. Nov. 3, 1996, at All; Farhan Haq, Burma: Students
Begin Three Days of Fastsfor Burma, Inter Press Service, Oct. 8, 1996.
3.
In June, 1989, the government of Burma changed the country's name
to the Union of Myanmar and renamed the capital, formerly Rangoon, Yangon.
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anti-Burma
initiatives
employ
immediate
economic
disengagement as a punitive measure against the regime in
Rangoon. 4 Federal legislation, on the other hand, threatens to
prohibit new investment as leverage to secure the safety of Aung
San Suu Kyi and other Burmese democracy leaders, and to
5
encourage dialogue and reconciliation.
Local excursions into the realm of foreign affairs are not
new, 6 but they continue to raise difficult issues. While several
The change was made, according to officials to "better reflect Burma's ethnic
diversity. The term Burma connotes Burman, the nation's dominant ethnic
group. to the exclusion of other ethnic minorities." Burma Takes Another Name:
Now, the Union of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1989, at A5. Rangoon was

changed to Yangon supposedly to reflect more faithfully contemporary usage.
2,000 Burmese ProtestAttack on Opposition Chief, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1989, § 1,
at 5.
4.
See Infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
5.
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104208. 110 Stat. 3009. Conditional sanctions on Burma were imposed as part of
the Act making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and
related programs for the year ending September 30, 1997. With regard to Burma,
the Act provides that until the President certifies to Congress "that Burma has
made measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices
and implementing democratic government," certain sanctions were to be imposed,
most notably an end to most bilateral assistance and obstruction by the United
States of most multilateral assistance. Id. In addition, certain "conditional
sanctions" were imposed. New investment in Burma was to be prohibited "if the
President determines and certifies to Congress that, after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Government of Burma has physically harmed,rearrested for political
acts, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale repression of
or violence against the Democratic opposition." Id. The Act further contemplated
that the President would "seek to develop . . . a comprehensive, multilateral
strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and the
quality of life in Burma, including the development of a dialogue between the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and democratic opposition
groups within Burma." Id.
"New investment" is defined in the Act to mean activity undertaken "on or
after the date of certification" by the President as contemplated by the Act, and is
limited to investment in developing resources located in Burma. Id. "New
Investment" specifically does not include "the entry into, performance of, or
financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology." Id.
Finally, the Act required the President to submit periodic reports to certain
Congressional committees on:
(1) progress toward democratization in Burma;
(2) progress on improving the quality of life of the Burmese people...,
(3) progress made In developing the strategy referred to in subsection (c)
[to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and to develop
a dialog between SLORC and opposition groups].
Id.

6.
As of 1991, more than 900 localities passed resolutions supporting a
"freeze" in the arms race; 197 demanded a halt to nuclear testing; 120 refused to
cooperate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's nuclear-war
exercises; 126, plus 27 states, divested more than $20 billion from firms doing
business in South Africa; 86 formed linkages with Nicaragua and, along with
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excellent articles on the constitutionality of these local measures
exist,7 the case law is almost completely undeveloped. 8 The fact
that serious questions remain about the constitutionality of these
local forays into foreign affairs may largely be due to the
significant
political
disincentives
to
challenging
their

grassroots activists, provided more humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan
people than all the military aid Congress voted for the contras: 80, along with the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, demanded cuts in the Pentagon's budget; 73 formed
sister-city relationships with Soviet cities (roughly 50 more are pending); 29
provided

sanctuary for Guatemalan

and Salvadoran

refugees:

20 passed

stratospheric protection ordinances phasing out ozone-depleting chemicals; and
at least 10 established funded offices of international affairs-In essence
municipal state departments. Howard N. Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism In
Foreign Affairs: State and Local ForeignPolicy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 563, 564 n.1 (1993); see also Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local
Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the FederalPower In Foreign Affairs,
72 VA. L. REV. 813, 815 n.14 (1986) (listing measures taken in several states
penalizing or proposing to penalize certain kinds of commerce in Iran, Northern
Ireland, Poland, Sri Lanka and Libya).
7.
See generally Fenton. supra note 6; Garrett M. Smith, Board of
Trustees v. City of Baltimore: Public Pension Fund Divestment of South African
Securities Upheld, 49 MD. L. REV. 1030 (1990); Richard B. Bilder, The Role of
States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821 (1989); Anne R.
Bowden, Note, North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute. 67 N.C. L. REV.
949 (1989); Patrick J. Borchers & Paul F. Dauer, Taming the New Breed of Nuclear
Free Zone Ordinances:Statutory and ConstitutionalInfirmities In Local Procurement
Ordinances Blacklisting the Producers of Nuclear Weapons Components, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 87 (1988); Cinthia R. Fischer. Federal Preemption and the South
African Sanctions:A Survival Guldefor States and Cities, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 693 (1988); Barry E. Carter, InternationalEconomic Sanctions: Improving the
Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime. 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162 (1987); Kevin P. Lewis,
Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment
Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469 (1987); Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local
Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power In Foreign Affairs,
72 VA. L. REV. 813 (1986); Grace A. Jubinsky, Note. State and Municipal
Governments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the
Constitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 543 (1985);
Christina Walsh, Note, The Constitutionality of State and Local Governments'
Response to Apartheid:Divestment Legislation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763 (1985).
8.
The jurisprudence on the specific issue of the constitutionality of local
requirements for divestment and debarment is almost non-existent. In Board of
Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Lubman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990), a Maryland court upheld
the constitutionality under the U.S. Constitution of a Baltimore law requiring
divestment of a retirement fund from stocks in corporations doing business in
South Africa. In United States v. City of Oakland, D.C. No. CV-89-03305-JPV
(N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 958 F.2d 300 (1992), the court granted the government
summary judgment against Oakland's nuclear free zone ordinance, which
included a contract debarment provision. In Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v.
State, 419 N.W.2d 773 (Mich. App. 1988) and Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc.
v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986). state laws requiring divestment or denying
tax exemption on the basis of a South African nexus were struck down, but on
state constitutional grounds.
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constitutionality. 9
Few corporations would have been bold
enough to challenge a community's censure of apartheid, and not
many more will want to be perceived as supporting the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime in remote Burma.
This Article analyzes the constitutionality of these state and
local enactments under the U.S. Constitution. Part II of this
Article reviews the character of these statutes and ordinances,
examining their structure, language, and adoption. In Part III,
the constitutional infirmities of these state and local enactments
are presented and discussed.
With a detailed analysis of
Supreme Court case law, this Article asserts that these state and
local enactments are constitutionally infirm under preemption,
the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
Further, this Article suggests that these
statutes and ordinances may also amount to an impermissible
delegation by state and local governments under Due Process.
Part IV of this Article then presents the practical problems of
multiple foreign policies by federal, state, and local governments,
including the failure to "speak with one voice" on international
issues. Finally, this Article concludes that these state and local
laws are unconstitutional and susceptible to great mischief, and
that their constitutional infirmities are congruent with their
practical flaws. Finally, in the case of Burma, local enactments,
however well-intentioned, may even work at cross purposes with
national policy.

II. LOCAL ENACTMENTS
It is not difficult to understand why Burma has captured the
attention of American activists, nor why local initiatives such as
those under discussion have proliferated. Aung San Suu Kyi's
serene and principled stand against a military regime calling itself
the SLORC' 0 presents a "good" versus "evil" scenario ripe for

9.
And the process by which foreign policy is thus made. As reported in
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, for instance, Takoma Park's debarment ordinance "began

in the spring, when supporters and Burmese students primarily from
Montgomery College's Takoma Park campus began discussing the issue with
residents and city officials.... At a September 9 City Council hearing, about 100
people stressed charges of drug trafficking, human rights and other abuses."
Reiners, supranote 2. The outcome of that process, such as it was, has become a
component of U.S. foreign trade policy.
10.
"In 1988, the SLORC-SLORC-that stands for the State Law and Order
Restoration Council. What a name; what a name. Talk about a fascist name."
142 CONG. REc. S8795 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. D'Amato); see
also Id. at S8756 ("A military regime whose initials form the unenviable acronym
SLORC, as if 'SLORCing" out of the black lagoon.") (remarks of Sen. Moynihan).
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indignation. 1 An issue such as this presents a high visibility,
low risk opportunity for local political leaders and activist groups.
It "draws the attention of the local press, is more substantive
than adoption of a precatory resolution of censure or12 disapproval,
and presents little economic risk to the jurisdiction."'
The first city to act was Berkeley, California, which passed a
Resolution in February, 1995 prohibiting contracts for personal
services or for the purchase of commodities from entities doing
business in Burma "until the City Council determines that the
people of Burma have become self-governing."' 13 The first state to
act was Massachusetts, which amended its general laws in June
1996, to prohibit the state, except in certain limited
circumstances, from doing business with entities on a "restricted
purchase list" supposedly containing the names "of all persons
currently doing business with Burma (Myanmar)."'14 Seven other
localities adopted like measures within the next eighteen
months. 15
The local measures are similar in most salient respects.
Each contains a preamble referencing and condemning the
political practices of the Burmese regime, and several refer to the
struggles and valor of Aung San Suu Kyi and other notables who
have expressed their opposition to the SLORC regime.16
Significantly for purposes of constitutional analyses, each locality,
except Ann Arbor and Carborro, includes in its measure language
purporting to establish a legitimate local purpose in taking a
stand against injustice across the world. Berkeley's measure
begins:

11.
It is unclear, in the absence of such a luminous contrast, why Burma
would stand so starkly apart from other regimes in Asia whose human rights
records are arguably as poor. China, in its well documented dealings with Tibet
and with its own citizens in Tienanmen Square, comes to mind as does Indonesia
in its handling of East Timor. Likewise, the Vietnamese political system Is not
notable for its concern with individual liberties.
12.
Fenton, supra note 6, at 590.
13.
Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 57.881-N.S., IIIB and IVB (Feb. 28,
1995). Berkeley was also the first U.S. city to pass such a bill in the antiapartheid campaign against South Africa. Tiffany Danitz, Senate May Follow
State, City Actions to PunishBurma, WASH. TIMES, May 4, 1995, at A20.

14.

Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130 § 22J(a), 1996 Mass. Acts 210, 212.

15.
Madison, Wis., Resolution No. 52,471, I.D. No. 17607 (Aug. 15, 1995);
Santa Monica, Cal., Selective Purchasing Ordinance, Resolution No. 8966 (Nov.
28, 1995); Oakland, Cal., Selective Purchasing Law; Ann Arbor, Mich., Resolution
Barring Purchases from Businesses in Burma and from Those Doing Business
with Burma (Myanmar) (Apr. 15. 1996); SAN FRANCIScO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12J. 1
(1996); Carborro, N.C., Resolution Barring Purchases from Businesses in Burma
and from Those Doing Business with Burma, Resolution No. 18/96-97 (Oct. 8.
1996); Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct. 28. 1996).
16.
Berkeley; Madison; Oakland; San Francisco; and Takoma Park.
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The citizens of the City of Berkeley, believing that their quality of
life is diminished when peace and justice are not fully present in
the world adopted Ordinance No. 5985-N.S. to promote universal
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, recognize the
responsibility of local communities to take positive steps to support
the rule of law and to help end injustices and egregious violations
of human rights wherever they may occur .... 17
San Francisco's and Takoma Park's measures contains almost
identical language. Madison's ordinance notes that the SLORC

regime is "illegal and contrary to international law and
covenants," and declares its existence "morally repugnant to the
,,18 Santa Monica's measure
citizens of the City of Madison ....
recites how "the city and the government of the City of Santa
Monica reflect a community united in its commitment to policies
which guarantee broad human rights to people throughout the
Oakland "recognize[s] the moral responsibility of
world." 19
rights abuses
communities to take positive steps to end human
20
and support legitimately elected governments.
Further, with respect to substantive debarment provisions,
First, the
two distinct but related features are notable.
Massachusetts statute and four city measures incorporate the
analysis of independent organizations in determining which
businesses are present in Burma (as variously defined and
modified) so as to merit debarment. 2 1 Second, none of the

17.
Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 57,881-N.S. (Feb. 28, 1995).
18.
Madison, Wis., Resolution No. 52,471, I.D. No. 17607 (Aug. 15. 1995).
19.
Santa Monica, Cal., Selective Purchasing Ordinance, Resolution No.
8966 (Nov. 28, 1995).
20.
Oakland, Cal., Selective Purchasing Law.
21.
The Massachusetts statute provides that a "restricted purchase list"
will be compiled after consultation with "United Nations reports, resources of the
Investor Responsibility Research Center and the Associates to Develop
Democratic Burma, and other reliable sources." Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, §
22J(b), 1996 Mass. Acts 210, 212.
Oakland "shall make use of information provided by the Investor
Oakland, Cal.,
Responsibility Research Center and other reliable sources."
Selective Purchasing Law.
San Francisco provides that "'prohibited person or entity' shall mean any
person or entity designated by the Investor Responsibility Research Center" but
provides that the city "shall have authority to delete from such list any person or
entity designated by the IRRC as having investments or employees in Burma if
any such entity demonstrates to the [city's] satisfaction that such designation is
erroneous." SAN FRANcIsco, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12J.1 (1996).
Takoma Park's Free Burma list "shall be the most current list of all companies
with direct investment or employees in Burma as listed by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center." Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct.
28, 1996).
Madison declares that it will use the "Council on Economic Priorities listing of
companies with economic Interest in Burma" in determining debarment.
Madison. Wis., Resolution No. 52,471, I.D. No. 17607 (Aug. 15, 1995).
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measures clearly defines or anticipates what constitutes doing
22
business "with" or "in" Burma.

22.
The Massachusetts statute, for instance, is not clear as to whether a
company needs majority ownership of the entity doing business in Burma to be
debarred, or whether the determinant is either a majority stake or "operations,
distribution agreements, or any other similar agreements In Burma." Act of June
25, 1996, ch. 130, § 22J(b), 1996 Mass. Acts. 210, 212. The statute may also
mean that "operations" is that level of activity which places a company on the
"Restricted Purchase list." which is itself derived from third parties using their
own formulae for such inclusion.
San Francisco's "Prohibited Person or Entity" list is compiled by reference to
the IRRC list, which is characterized as including "any person or entity... having
investments or employees in Burma, or any person or entity that licenses any
person or entity organized under the laws of Burma (Myanmar) to produce and
market its products." SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12J.1 (1996). The
ordinance is silent as to the implications of activity in Burma by a parent
corporation, a partly-owned subsidiary, or an affiliate, relying presumably on the
discretion to be exercised by the IRRC in compiling its list.
Takoma Park similarly contemplates compilation of a "Takoma Park Free
Burma list" adopted from the IRRC list, with modifications to ensure debarment
of "any person or corporation which has equity ties with any public or private
entity located in Burma." Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct. 28, 1996).
"Equity ties" is left undefined, and the measure itself lapses into opacity in
debarring the purchase of any commodity from "any person for the express
purpose of investing in business operations or trading with any public or private
entity that is located in Burma or has direct investment or employees in Burma."
Id.
Takoma Park's ordinance also has the unique distinction of disqualifying any
lawyer and law firm from performing legal services for the city if it represents "any
person or corporation which has equity ties with any public or private entity
located in Burma," or would even be "willing" to provide legal services to the
SLORC regime. Id. (emphasis added).
Berkeley's ordinance prohibits the city from entering into contracts with any
person who "buys, sells, leases or distributes commodities in the conduct of
business with, or who provides or is willing to provide personal services to... any
person for the express purpose of assisting in business operations or trading with
any public or private entity located in Burma." Berkeley. Cal., Resolution No. 57,
881-N.S., IIIB & lVB (Feb. 28, 1995) (emphasis added). While the measure
provides that the City Manager may promulgate rules and regulations "necessary
or appropriate to carry out the purpose and requirements" of the Resolution, as of
yet none have been. Id.
Oakland debars entities on a "List" compiled from the IRRC and "other reliable

sources." Oakland, Cal., Selective Purchasing Law.
Madison provides that it will use the list compiled by the Council on Economic
Priorities to determine which entities have an "economic interest" in Burma, and
then defines economic interest to include "(a) direct investment, (b) licensing and
leasing agreements, and (c) the operation of sales outlets in Burma (Myanmar)."
Madison, Wis., Resolution No. 52,471, I.D. No. 17607 (Aug. 15. 1995).
Santa Monica's Ordinance, while resolving to debar contracts with entities
doing business in Burma or purchasers of goods produced in Burma, in its text
seems to prohibit only the purchase of goods actually made in Burma and to
debar only entities actually doing business with SLORC or SLORC owned entities.
Ann Arbor and Carborro simply prohibit contracts with entities "who do
business" in Burma. Both measures are silent as to what level of activity is
required to trigger the debarment provisions.
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More significantly, however, several of the measures include
23
language contemplating their possible constitutional infirmity.
The measures adopted by Berkeley, Madison, Oakland, San
Francisco, and Takoma Park provide as follows:
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the power of a
municipality to make legitimate economic decisions without being
subject to the restraints of the Interstate Commerce Clause when it
participates in the market place as a corporation or a citizen as
opposed to exerting its regulatory powers. 24

III. CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON LOCAL FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

All of the cited measures are vulnerable to constitutional
attack on three grounds, and by delegating legislative authority to
third parties for the compilation of "restricted" or "prohibited"
lists, possibly four. First, the local measures are preempted by
Second, under the Foreign Commerce
federal legislation. 25
Clause of the Constitution, they constitute an impermissible
26
intrusion into an area reserved for the federal government.
Third, the local measures are an impermissible usurpation of

federal authority under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.2 7 These latter two doctrines are closely related.2 8
Finally, those local measures that incorporate by reference the
judgment of third parties such as the Investor Responsibility
Research Center may present Due Process problems if found as a
29
matter of fact to be an impermissible delegation of authority.

23.
See Infra Part IIIB.
24.
Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 57, 881-N.S., IIIB & IVB (Feb. 28, 1995);
Madison, Wis., Resolution No. 52,471, I.D. No. 17607 (Aug. 15, 1995); Oakland,
Cal., Selective Purchasing Law; SAN FRANcIsCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12J. 1 (1996);

Tokoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct. 28, 1996).
25.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
26.
Id. art. I, § 8,cl.3.
Id. art. VI, cl.2.
27.
28.
"Although the two doctrines are closely related, they have evolved on
distinct precedential foundations and, at the margins, may denote different
thresholds of constitutionality." Spiro, supra note 6. at 834, 841. A Commerce
Clause analysis may be "overshadowed" by the fact that local initiatives impinge
on foreign relations. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434 (1979), discussed Infra at Part If(b), in which the Supreme Court, in deciding
a case on foreign Commerce Clause grounds, invokes language and reasoning
from non-commercial cases, specifically the concept that the nation must "speak
with one voice" In foreign affairs. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
29.
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A. Preemption
Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws and
treaties of the United States are "the Supreme Law of the Land"
and prevail over, or preempt, state and local enactments. Thus
any local law that purports to regulate or govern a matter
explicitly3" or implicitly covered by federal legislation is
preempted, even if it is in an area otherwise amenable to state
regulation. 3 1 Since the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 199732 is silent as to its preemptive effect, preemption, if it
exists, must be implied.
The parameters of implied preemption were spelled out in
Hines v. Davidowitz,33 which dealt with Pennsylvania's attempts
to impose registration requirements on aliens that were in several
respects different from and more onerous than the federal
requirements. The Pennsylvania law contained a number of
provisions evincing a suspicion of or hostility to aliens, i.e., the
requirement to carry identification cards with proof of
registration, many of which the Supreme Court found had
actually been considered by Congress, severely criticized, and not
34
included in the federal act.
The Supreme Court struck down Pennsylvania's law, noting
that the "basic subject of the state and federal laws is
The only question is whether . . . the state and
identical....
Federal Government have concurrent jurisdiction . .."35 Even in
the absence of preemption, however, the fate of the Pennsylvania
statute may have been sealed because it interfered in foreign
affairs. Taking careful note of the possible foreign ramifications of
Pennsylvania's hostility to aliens, 36 the Court reiterated that the
"the supremacy of the national power in the general field of
foreign affairs... is made clear by the Constitution, was pointed
out by the authors of The Federalist in 1787, and has since been
given continuous recognition by this Court.

37

30.
See, e.g.. Export Administration Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §
2407(c) (West 1991). The law specifically states that its provisions "shall preempt
any law, rule, or regulation of any of the several States" or governmental
subdivision thereof. Id.
31.
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
32.
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 10433.
208, 110 Stat. 3009.
34.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 61.
35.
36.
Id. at 64.
37.
Id. at 62 (citations omitted); see also discussion infra Part 11(c)
regarding the Federal Supremacy Issue.

1997 UNCONSTITUTIONAL1IY OF RESTRICTING BUSINESS TIES WITH BURMA185

The Court could not provide a timeless prescription for
circumstances in which preemption would be found. "In the final
analysis," it said, "there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula. Our primary function is to determine whether,
under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's

law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 38 Important in
considering the question of whether federal enactments preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject was "[tihe nature of

the power exerted by Congress, the object sought to be attained,
39
and the character of the obligations imposed by the law ....
Furthermore, in the field of international relations "[any

concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the
is not bottomed on the
narrowest of limits; the state's power here
40
same broad base as is its power to tax."
Indeed, not only may "[tihe scheme of federal regulation .
be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it,"4 1 but even
legislation facially consistent with a stated federal policy may be
preempted if the Court finds that it intrudes on foreign commerce.
In South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 42 for instance, the
Court struck down an Alaskan statute that required any timber
sold within the state to have been processed in Alaska. Although
this requirement did not in fact conflict with any federal law, the
Court made it clear that the state had to show more than
consistency with federal policy in taking a step so intrusive on
foreign commerce. The Court stated:
The need for affirmative approval is heightened by the fact that
Alaska's policy has substantial ramifications beyond the Nation's
borders. The need for a consistent and coherent foreign policy,
which is the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government,

enhances the necessity that congressional authorization not be
43
lightly implied.

Finally, the constitutionality of contract debarment laws that
impinge on federal jurisdiction may already have been decided by
the Supreme Court in Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould.4 4 In
Gould, the state of Wisconsin had sought to punish companies
violating the National Labor Relations Act 45 by barring such firms

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 68.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
Id. at 92 n.7.
Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).

45.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935).
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The Supreme Court held
from receiving state contracts.
Wisconsin could not enact such measures and expressed a
concern completely appropriate to the Burma sanctions,
specifically the proliferation of local sanctions which, while not
inconsistent with federal law, "further detracts from the
'integrated scheme of regulation' created by Congress.

'46

"[I]f

Wisconsin's debarment law is valid, nothing prevents other States
from taking similar action against labor law violators ....

Each

additional statute incrementally diminishes the Board's control
over enforcement of the NLRA .. ..,47 The State's "goal may be

laudable, but it assumes for the State of Wisconsin a role
reserved exclusively for the [National Labor Relations]
Congress
48
Board."

Juxtaposing federal law imposing conditional sanctions on
Burma with the local enactments leaves little room for a plausible
argument that the state and local ordinances are not preempted.
Senator Mitchell McConnell of Kentucky tried without success to

persuade his colleagues in the U.S. Senate to require U.S.
business interests to withdraw from Burma, the stated purpose of
the local measures. 4 9 A review of Senator McConnell and his
supporters' comments to the Senate in July, 1996, when an
Amendment removed provisions from his bill requiring an
economic withdrawal, establishes that his motivations and
objectives were completely congruent with the local measures now
While every legislator who spoke voiced
under scrutiny.50
46.
Gould, 475 U.S. at 288-89.
47.
Id. at 288.
48.
Id. at 291.
49.
His bill to impose sanctions against Burma. first introduced on July
28, providing that "[nio United States National may make any investment in
Burma," would have required the Secretary of State to "prohibit the use of United
States passports for travel to Burma," and would have required the President to
"initiate negotiations with all foreign countries with which the United States
trades for the purpose of entering into agreements with the countries . . . to
support United States sanctions .against Burma," and provided steps the
President would take to punish those countries if they did not go along with
American demands that Burma be economically isolated. See S. 1092, 104th
Cong. (1995).
50. The [Cohen amendment calling for conditional sanctions rather than
mandatory sanctions] actually makes the situation worse, in my opinion.
It will allow aid to ...increase. In other words.., it is worse than current
law because last year we voted to cut off a narcotics program in that
country because we did not have any confidence in dealing with [SLORCI.
This would make those dealings possible again should the administration
decide to engage in it.
The second condition in the Cohen amendment which seems to me
to be troublesome is it makes Aung San Suu Kyi's personal security the
issue rather than the restoration of democracy. In other words, if you see
that Aung San Suu Kyi is in trouble or there is large-scale trouble or
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disapproval of the SLORC regime, most senators viewed their
decision as involving "the effectiveness of mandatory .
sanctions as a tool of foreign policy to encourage change in
Burma. It is about the best policy to pursue that will bring 5about
1
the changes that we all want to see in the nation of Burma."
The proponents of mandatory unilateral sanctions did not
prevail.
Instead, the Amendment filed by Senator Cohen,
reflecting his analysis as to the better federal policy, is now the
law of the land. 5 2

Furthermore, the State Department and the

53
President also rejected the McConnell view.

violence, then you can take certain actions if you want to, but you do not
have to because all of it can be waived.
In short, with all due respect to my good friend from Maine [Senator
Cohen], it seems to me that this amendment basically gives the
administration total flexibility to do whatever they want to do, which every
administration would love to have. I can understand why they support
this amendment. But looking at the track record of this administration
and the previous one, given the discretion to do nothing, nothing is what
you get. Nothing is what we can anticipate from this administration, and
that is what we got from the last one.
142 CONG. REc. S8811 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
Senator D'Amato, supporting Senator McConnell's bill, agreed:
Business is important. Providing economic growth and opportunity is
important. But freedom and liberty is more important. The human dignity
of each and every individual and their right to live without being
terrorized, both in this country and abroad, are more important.
We should not be providing succor and comfort to those who deprive
millions and millions of people an opportunity to live free, an opportunity
to be able to have their vote count ....
Id. at S8795-96 (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
With respect to the argument that sanctions would hurt American companies
and not inflict much damage on companies of other countries, Senator Moynihan
argued in support of the McConnell Bill that the principle was worth the price:
The world is watching. We are going to hear today-and we will not
hear wrong--that if we impose these sanctions, American firms will lose

opportunities, and European firms or Asian firms will take advantage of
them. And that may be true. But I wonder for how long, and I wonder in
the end at what profit. If our firms are strong and competitive and
international, it is because of the principles the United States has stood
for in this century, and should continue to stand for.
Id. at S8756 (statement of Sen. Moynihan in support of the McConnell Bill).
His position was not accepted by the Senate.
51.
142 CONG. REc. S8809 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Craig).
52. [Tlhe question is, does the [mandatory sanctions] approach . . .
increase America's ability to foster change in Burma and strengthen our
hand and allow the United States to engage in the type of delicate
diplomacy needed to help a poor and oppressed people obtain better living
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standards, political and civic freedoms, and a brighter future as a dynamic
Asian economy....
I think, Mr. President, with all due respect, the answer is no. By
adopting the [McConnell] language the Senate will be sending the following
message:
That the United States is ready to relinquish all of Its remaining
leverage in Burma;
That America is shutting every door and cutting off all of its alreadydepleted stake in Burma's future;
That the Congress is ready to further bind the hands of this and any
future administrations, taking away those tools of diplomacy-incentives,
both in a positive and negative sense-which are crucial if we are ever
going to hope to effect change in a nation where our words and actions
already carry diminished clout.
...
We all sense the plight of the Burmese people. We know the
United States must support the forces of democratic change in Burma....
I think we have to recognize the reality of the situation in Burma and
our influence over there.
142 CONG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
Burma is located in one of the most dynamic regions of the
world.... I suggest, Mr. President, that we have seen the flowering of
democracy and freedom in parts of the world where values were quite alien
to those that we support.... The same thing can happen in Burma. The
best way to do that is to adopt a policy which gives the President some
tools to influence the situation. The subcommittee's proposal is all sticks,
no carrots. What we seek to do is give the President some limited
flexibility to improve the situation on behalf of the Burmese people.
Id. at S58747; see also 142 CONG. REc. S8749 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Johnston):
[T]his is a difficult question. No one defends the SLORC, the group that is
running Myanmar, or Burma .... The question is: Would it be effective to
do what Senator MCCONNELL has proposed?... Would it help achieve the
end? Mr. President, I think it would do precisely and exactly the opposite.
Mr. President, to cut off American participation in Burma-not
foreign participation but American participation-would be exactly the
wrong thing. First of all, It is no sanction because Americans are less than
10 percent of foreign investment in Burma today....
And the question is: Is it good to have an American company, or
would it be better to have Total, the French company, have the contract?
Really that is the question proposed by the McConnell approach. I submit
it is better to have an American company there.
See also 142 CONG. REc. S8750-51 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Bond):
How can we influence anything if we are the only ones outside the room
while the rest of the world is carrying on without us, probably happy to see
us play the self-righteous outsider and get out? I cannot see how
punishing United States firms by threatening to keep them out of Burma
is an effective way to bring about change. United States presence, U.S.
firms are the ones on the ground who can help spread American values.
53.
The Congressional Record contains a letter addressed to Senator
Cohen from the U.S. Department of State:
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The local measures are an attempt to implement through
local action a strategy expressly considered and rejected by the
Senate. The local measures seek to institute that situation which
opponents of the McConnell bill and proponents of the Cohen
amendment wanted to avoid: diminishing the U.S. presence in
Burma, reducing the flexibility and leverage the President has to
influence events in a volatile situation, and removing a salutary
U.S. influence from the local scene. Whether one agrees with the
Senate's analysis and conclusions is irrelevant; local measures
that may undermine the path chosen by the Senate must be
preempted, or the entire Senate discussion, if proponents of local
sanctions continue to prevail, is rendered moot.
This problem would persist even ifthe President were to
determine that conditions for imposing sanctions had arisen. The
federal act only prohibits "new investments," primarily in the
development of natural resources in Burma. 54 It specifically
exempts many, if not all, of the economic activities presently
caught in the web of state and local sanctions, namely "entry into,
performance of, or financing of a contract to sell or purchase
55
goods, services or technology."
B. The Foreign Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution prohibits

states or localities from regulating or taxing commerce if such
actions burden interstate or foreign commerce. 5 6 With regard to
foreign commerce, the Supreme Court has held that the federal

government's regulatory power is "exclusive,"5 7 and in a much
quoted phrase, has stated that the nation must "speak with one

[Wlelcom~ing] and supporting] the amendment which you and others have
offered to Section 569 (Limitation on Funds for Burma) of H.R. 3540....
We believe the current and conditional sanctions which your language
proposes are consistent with Administration policy. As we have stated on
several occasions in the past, we need to maintain our flexibility to
respond to events in Burma and to consult with Congress on appropriate
responses to ongoing and future development there.
142 CONG. REc. S8752-53 (daily ed. July 25, 1996).
54.
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 569() (c), 110 Stat. 3009.
55.
Id.
56. One of the major defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a
compelling reason for the calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
was the fact that the Articles essentially left the individual States free to
burden commerce both among themselves and with foreign countries very
much as they pleased.
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976).
57.
Id. at 286.
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voice" in its foreign commercial relations.5 8 As early as 1851, the
Supreme Court described the Commerce Clause as preventing:
discriminations favorable or adverse to commerce with particular
foreign nations [that] might be 'created by state laws ....

deeply

affecting that equality of commercial rights, and that freedom from
state interference, which those who formed the Constitution were
so anxious ta secure, and which the experience of more than half a
century has taught us to value so highly. 59

The seminal case applying Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 to
state legislation which burdens foreign commerce is Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,60 which dealt with several California
counties' attempts to impose ad valorem taxes on Japanese
shipping containers that were used consistently In international
commerce, but that happened to be sitting on a California wharf
or in a repair shop on a certain day of the year. The Court
concluded that the taxes were an impermissible impediment to
international commerce. "A] state tax on the instrumentalities of
foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential. 6 1
Accordingly, "[floreign
commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern.
'In
international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and
trade the people of the United States act through a single
government with unified and adequate national power.'- 6 2 This Is

also true in those situations where the federal government is
silent on a particular international issue. Even if Congress had
not acted on the Burma issue, "it long has been 'accepted
constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid

of Congressional legislation.

. .

affords some protection from state

legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such
cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the
state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of
the competing demands of the competing demands of state and
63
national interests.'"
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that "a more extensive
constitutional inquiry" is required when analyzing claims arising
under the Foreign Commerce Clause rather than under the
Interstate Commerce Clause.6 4 "It Is a well-accepted rule," the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
(1933)).
63.
64.
therein.

Id. at 285.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317 (1851).
Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 448 (quoting Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59
Id. at 454-55 (citations omitted).
Id. at 446; see also Bilder, supra note 7, at n.18, and cases cited
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Court has held, "that state restrictions burdening foreign
commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and searching
scrutiny."6 5 The Court has found "evidence that the [Flounders
intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be . . .
greater" than the federal government's power to regulate
66
interstate commerce, and citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
referred to the "[framers' overriding 66onern that 'the Federal
Government must speak with one voice when
regulating
67
commercial relations with foreign governments."'
Although the Constitution ... grants Congress power to regulate
commerce 'with foreign Nations' and 'among the several States' in
parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the
scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater. Cases of
this Court, stressing the need for uniformity in treating with other
68
nations, echo this distinction.
Because states and localities "have virtually no ability to

influence

a

particular

foreign nation

through curtailing

or

eliminating their own international trading activities (a primary
economic boycott), they exercise their domestic leverage over
firms with which they do business in a manner designed to
69
influence foreign nations (a secondary economic boycott.)"
Depending on the size of the government procurement contracts
involved and the market positions of the companies involved, these
laws range from being mere nuisances to constituting virtual
commands. The Eastman Kodak Company, for example, withdrew
from South Africa altogether, allegedly in response to the
threatened loss of its business with the New York City
70
Government.

Notwithstanding the obvious market power states possess,
several of the local ordinances reference a line of cases decided
under the Interstate Commerce Clause which hold that where a
state or locality imposes requirements on those with whom it does
business as a market participant, rather than as a "regulator,"
some interference with interstate commerce is permitted. 7 1 A
"market participant" analysis is inappropriate to the local Burma
enactments for at least three reasons.

65.
South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984); see
also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.9. (1980).
66.
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
67.
JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 449.
68.
Id. at 448 (citations omitted).
69.
Fenton, supranote 6, at 567.
70.
Id. at 571 (citation omitted).
71.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Oakland and Berkeley also
alluded to this doctrine in their South Africa resolutions. See Oakland, Cal.,
Ordinance 10, 611 C.M.S. (July 23, 1985); Berkeley, Cal., Res. 52, 858-N.S. (July
30, 1985).
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First, the market participant doctrine has no application in
those instances where the federal government has actually acted.
Except for those situations where federal law is silent, it is
irrelevant whether the local action is consistent with a federal
regulatory scheme as in Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould 72 or
inconsistent, and thus precluding the federal government from
"speaking with one voice." Federal law is not silent in the case
of
the Burma enactments.
Second, the Supreme Court has suggested that the market
participant doctrine does not apply when a restraint on foreign
commerce is alleged 73 and where constitutional scrutiny "may
well be more rigorous." 7 4 Indeed, it has never applied the market
75
participant doctrine to a case involving foreign commerce.

Third, and most significantly, even if this were a situation
where the federal government had not acted, and even if it did not
involve foreign commerce, the market participant doctrine would
not apply because the local Burma ordinances go beyond the
types of activities contemplated by the Court in carving out this
limited exception to the general prohibition on a locality's
intrusion into interstate or foreign commerce.
The market participant doctrine was first enunciated In
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,76 in which the Court upheld a
Maryland statutory scheme that made it more difficult for out-ofstate scrap processors to be awarded bounties for destroying cars
abandoned on state highways. The Court's rationale for allowing
the encumbrance of free commerce between the states was clear:
The Commerce Clause does not prohibit a state from
"participating in the market and exercising the right to favor Its

72.
"What the Commerce Clause would permit States to do in the absence
of the NLRA is thus an entirely different question from what States may do with
the Act in place. Congressional purpose is of course 'the ultimate touchstone.'"
Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986) (citations omitted).
73.
South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 102 (1984).
74.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n.9 (1980); see also
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v.
Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Il. 1986).
75.

There are also good practical reasons why this should be so:

Inasmuch as trade relations are now an inseparable part of U.S. foreign

relations, the proliferating state and local views expressed and promoted
through even the indirect trade restrictions have the potential to seriously
disrupt U.S. foreign policy. They may also interfere with the ability of U.S.
firms to pursue trade opportunities around the globe. Working through

the maze of federal trade controls is difficult enough without having to
consider the foreign policy goals of 50 states and hundreds of local
jurisdictions.
Fenton, supra note 6, at 566.
76.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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own citizens over others."7 7 In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 78 the Court
permitted South Dakota to restrict its sales of state produced
cement to out-of-state buyers. The Court observed that the states
have a role as "guardian and trustee" for their citizens, noted the
state's apprehension that absent its intervention cement
shortages would be "threatening the people of this state,"7 9 and
held that this both suggested a duty and supplied a legitimate
80
local purpose for states to discriminate in their citizen's favor.
The limits of the doctrine are seen in White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers, Inc.,8 1 in which the Court
considered a mayoral order that required all construction projects
funded in whole or in part by the city to be performed by at least
one-half Boston residents.
The Court upheld this particular
requirement, but cautioned that state and local governments
could not develop restrictions that "reach beyond the immediate
82
parties with which the government transacts business.
Because the mayor's order "cover[ed] a discrete, identifiable class
of economic activity in which the city [was] a major participant,"
the order fell within the limits of the doctrine. 83 The Court noted,
"Everyone affected by the mayoral order is, in a substantial if
84
informal sense, 'working for the city.'
If White left any ambiguity as to the limits of the market
85
participant doctrine, South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke
removed it. In South-Central Timber, the State of Alaska sought to

require all timber sold from certain state owned parcels to be
processed within the state. Alaska argued that it was acting as
"'a seller of timber, pure and simple,"' 8 6 and that it could thereby
impose any requirements on a sale that any private person could.
The Court found it "clear that the State is more than merely a
87
seller of timber."
In the commercial context, the seller usually has no say over, and
no interest in, how the product is to be used after sale; in this case,
however, payment for the timber does not end the obligations of
the purchaser, for, despite the fact that the purchaser has taken
delivery of the timber and has paid for it,
he cannot do with it as he

77.
Id. at 810.
78.
Stake, 447 U.S. at 429 (1980).
79.
Id. at 430.
80.
Id. at 438.
81.
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983).
82.
Id. at 211.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
86.
Id. at 96 (quoting Respondents' Brief at 28).
87.
Id.
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pleases. Instead he is obligated to deal with a stranger [a local
88
processor] to the contract after completion of the sale.

This, the Court said, rendered Alaska more than a mere
market participant.
There are sound reasons for distinguishing between a State's
preferring its own residents in the initial disposition of goods when
it is a market participant and a State's attachment of restrictions
on dispositions subsequent to the goods coming to rest In private
hands ....
Instead of merely choosing its own trading partners, the State is
attempting to govern the private, separate economic relationships
of its trading partners; that is, it restricts the post-purchase activity
of the purchaser, rather than merely the purchasing activity. In
contrast to the situation in White, this restriction on private
economic activity takes place after the completion of the parties'
direct commercial obligations, rather than during the course of an
ongoing commercial relationship in which the city retained a
continuing proprietary Interest in the subject of the contract.
[Citation omitted.] In sum, the State may not avail itself of the
market-participant doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation
89
of the timber-processingmarket in which it Is not a participant.

The Court's language establishes that the market-participant
doctrine could not reasonably be invoked to immunize local

debarment enactments predicated on the political acts of a foreign
government.
The market-participant doctrine permits a State to influence "a
discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which [it] is a
major participant. [Citation omitted].
Contrary to the State's
contention, the doctrine is not carte blanche to impose any
conditions that the State has the economic power to dictate, and
does not validate any requirement merely because the State
imposes it upon someone with whom it Is in contractual privity.
[Citation omitted.]
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that It
allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in
which It is a participant,but allows it to go no further. The State
may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or
contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that
particular market. [Citation omitted.] Unless the "market" is
relatively narrowly defined, the doctrine has the potential of
swallowing up the rule that States may not impose substantial
burdens on interstate commerce even if they act with [a]
permissible state purpose ....90

In the South Africa divestment debate, the issue became
whether the state as an investment market participant had the
same rights as a private investor to decide with whom to do

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 98-99 (emphasis added),
Id. at 97-98 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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business. 9 1 While the issue was not resolved in that context,
debarment in an area subject to federal action is probably
prohibited under Wisconsin v. Gould.92
Wisconsin notes correctly that state action in the nature of "market
participation" is not subject to the restrictions placed on state
regulatory power by the Commerce Clause. We agree with the
Court of Appeals, however, that by flatly prohibiting state
purchases from repeat labor law violators Wisconsin "simply is not
functioning as a private purchaser of services." For all practical
purposes, Wisconsin's debarment scheme is tantamount to
regulation.

93

The problem for localities advancing the market participant
argument is compounded by the complete absence of a legally
cognizable local purpose, something that existed in each of the
While several of the anti-Burma
market participant cases.
measures purport to establish a nexus is between local interests
and ethical concerns abroad, such a nexus is beyond anything
the Court has ever recognized as weighing in the balance
regarding the "necessary accommodation between local needs and
the overriding requirement of freedom for the national
94

commerce."
In contrast, the necessary
balance was best articulated in
95
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.

Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. [citation omitted] If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
96
on the nature of the local interest involved ....

In Pike, which dealt with Arizona's attempt to impose a
packing and labelling requirement on melon growers, the Court
said:

See sources cited supra note 7.
91.
92.
Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1986); see
also supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. Professor Tribe agrees, noting
that a focus on a state's right to decide with whom it will conduct business by
virtue of its criteria is vastly different from a focus on the state as dictating to
business how it can become a candidate for a state's business. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-22, at 375 (1978).
93.
Gould, 475 U.S. at 289 (citations omitted).
94.
Great AI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976) (quoting
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)).
95.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S 137 (1970).
96.
Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
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We are not, then, dealing here with 'state legislation in the field of
safety where the propriety of local regulation, has long been
recognized'.... [T]he Arizona statute ... does impose ...
a
straitjacket on the appellee company with respect to the allocation
of its interstate resources. Such an incidental consequence of a
regulatory scheme could perhaps be tolerated if a more compelling
state interest were involved. But here the State's interest [in
ensuring people knew certain high quality cantaloupes were grown
in Arizona] is minimal at best - certainly less substantial than a
97
State's interest in securing employment for its people.

In the context of foreign relations, the Court set a clear
standard for weighing the balance in Container Corp. of America v.
FranchiseTax Board.98 According to the Court, permissible local
actions are those that have a legitimate local purpose with
"merely foreign resonances" short of interfering with foreign
affairs. 9 9 It is unclear how the balancing test should be applied
to local ordinances designed to have a foreign effect.10 0
Several local enactments under scrutiny purport to serve a
legitimate local purpose in the hope of surviving a constitutional

97.
Id. at 143, 146.
98.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd.. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
99.
Id. at 194; see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69
(1945). which talks of the "regulation of local matters [that] may also operate as a
regulation of commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state

and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation
of the competing demands of the state and national interests Involved."
100. Local officials have made no secret of the fact that their objectives are
to get as many business entities as possible to sever all ties with Burma. For
instance, on hearing that Motorola had closed its operations In Burma so as to
compete successfully for a San Francisco contract, Supervisor Tom Ammiano,
who proposed the legislation in San Francisco, was reported to be delighted with
the news and said "This shows that the Burma boycott is working .... It shows
that business people are heeding the prohibition." Leslie Goldberg, Motorola Gets
Out of Burma, Into City: Firm's Closing of Office Likely to Net It $40 Million S.F.
Radio Contract,"S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 6, 1996, at Al.
Similarly, Jane Jerome of the Bay Area Burma Roundtable, one of the several
groups that lobbied for the ordinance, is reported to have said of It: "We found
that sanctions against South Africa were very effective in bringing substantial
change in that country. It seemed logical to use the same tactics on Burma."
Leslie Goldberg, 911 Radio Bidders Run Afoul of Policy: S.F. Averse to Hiring Firms
That Do Business in Burma, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 24, 1996, at Al [hereinafter
Goldberg, 911 Radio Bidders].
Indeed, the specific and only aim of the debarment ordinances is to make an
impact In and on Burma. On hearing that Apple Computers was withdrawing
from Burma so as to retain its Massachusetts contracts, "Rep. Byron Rushing...
who marshalled the [debarment] bill through the [Massachusetts] Legislature" Is
reported to have reacted: "This is exactly what we want this law to do .... We
hope the rest of the companies will also get out." Frank Phillips, Apple Cites
Mass. Law In Burma Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1996, at B6.
The Takoma ordinance actually requires copies of it to be sent to, among
others, the Burmese Ambassador, the Secretary General of the United Nations,
and Aung San Suu Kyi.
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challenge. 1"' The Berkeley Ordinance has a preamble that states
that the "quality of life" of the people of Berkeley "is diminished
when peace and justice are not fully present in the world," and
"recognize[s] the responsibility of local communities to take
positive steps to support the rule of law and to help end injustices
and egregious violations of human rights wherever they may
occur." 1 0 2
San Francisco's Ordinance contains a similar
declaration, 10 3 as does Takoma Park and Maryland's.' 0 4 Takoma
Park's enactment, however, "recognize[s] the important role local
communities can take to promote universal respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms," and emphasizes its "strong
and vibrant tradition of organizing local action to affect larger
as manifested by the Takoma Park Nuclear Free
world events,
05
Zone Act."'
Perhaps the clearest rebuttal to the argument that this
alleged interest constitutes a local nexus to an international event
is found in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,' 0 6 a standing case. In
Luzan, as in the case of localities attempting to establish a
sufficient nexus between a world event and a local interest by a
showing of local injury, the plaintiffs tried to stop certain
construction projects abroad that threatened a certain species of
Nile crocodile and Asian elephant, and argued that they had
standing under an "ecosystem nexus" theory where "any person
who uses any part of a 'contiguous ecosystem' adversely affected
by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a
great distance away."' 0 7 The plaintiffs also argued standing
based on an "animal nexus" theory, "whereby anyone who has an
interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere
on the globe has standing." 08
The Court flatly rejected both theories of standing:
This is beyond all reason. Standing is not 'an ingenious academic
It goes beyond the limit... and
exercise in the conceivable,' ....
into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes
or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is
appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of
10 9
that species with which he has no more specific connection.

104.

See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 57,881-N.S. (Feb. 28, 1995).
SAN FRANCIsCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12J.l(a) (1996).
Takoma Park, Md.. Ordinance 1966-33 (Oct. 28, 1996).

105.

Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 566-67 (citation omitted). "No traditionally local concerns, such

101.
102.

103.

as maintaining the integrity of health, safety, and other welfare-related standards,
are implicated. Recognition of a state's 'moral' interest in severing economic ties
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C. The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Article VI, clause
2, provides that the foreign policy of the United States will be
conducted by the federal government.
Consequently, local
enactments designed to participate in the conduct of foreign
policy may run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. In Hines V.
Davidowitz,110 the Supreme Court was explicit in defining the
boundary:
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective
interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and
exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign
sovereignties. 'For local interests the several States of the Union
exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.'
Our system of government Is such that the interest of the cities,
counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the
whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field
affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local
interference. 111

Zschernig v. Miller,112 a landmark on the subject, was decided
at the height of the Cold War and reflects the Court's distaste for
local officials attempting to imprint their particular reaction to an

international matter in their local governance, even in a field so
specifically subject to local regulation as probate. In Zschernig,
an Oregon statute prohibited a resident of East Germany from
inheriting under an Oregon will on the basis (couched in general
language but leaving no doubt as to its rationale) that no
Oregonian could receive an estate bequeathed him from behind
the Iron Curtain because the recipient stood a good chance of
getting his proceeds confiscated.
Citing Hines, the Court
disallowed the meddling as "an intrusion by the State into the
field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and the Congress," 1 3 and would not permit the
practice of "the probate courts of various States . . . launch[ing]
inquiries into the type. of governments that obtain in particular
foreign nations. " "'
What was supposed to be a probate statute
was, in effect, "not an inheritance statute, but a statute of
confiscation and retaliation,"" l 5 and "foreign policy attitudes, the
freezing or thawing of the 'cold war,' and the like [were] the real
with South Africa-related concerns as a 'legitimate' Justification for impeding
interstate commerce would be unprecedented." Spiro, supra note 6, at 834.
110. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
111. Id. at 63 (citations omitted).
112. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
113. Id. at 432.
114. Id. at 433-34.
115. Id. at 434 (citation omitted).
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desiderata. " l 16
That, the Court said, "affects international
relations in a persistent and subtle way," and "must give way if
I
they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy." 17
Particularly noteworthy as well is that the Court reached its
decision in spite of an amicus brief filed by the Justice
Department which indicated that it had no objection to Oregon's
statutory stand against Communism. 1 18 "But," Justice Stewart
found, "that is not the point. We deal here with the basic
allocation of power between the States and the Nation.
Resolution of so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot vary
from day to day with the shifting winds at the State
Department."1 19

The Supremacy Clause analysis is thus quite similar to the
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. A local action must have a
legitimate local purpose, and its effect on foreign affairs, "a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject,"' 20 must be incidental.
The analysis, whether
regarding preemption or under the Foreign Commerce or
Supremacy Clauses, contemplates that the nation must speak
with one voice, and that particularly in foreign matters, the voice
must emanate from the federal government.
The logic of this rationale is obvious. "If state action could
defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences might
ensue. The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State
12 1
created difficulties with a foreign power."'
D. Possible Impermissible Delegation
The yardstick by which Massachusetts and several local
governments have decided to measure compliance by reference to
third party organizations, primarily the Investor Responsibility

116.

Id. at 437.

117.
118.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).

119. Id.
120.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 n.287 (1941)).

121.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942).

Consider also a

parallel scenario involving an economically powerful state like California and a
relatively influential trading partner like Mexico. A California initiative, in

response to a purely local grievance, to ban all contracts with companies doing
business in Mexico could provoke retribution felt well beyond California's
borders. In the case of Burma, retribution is unavailable, but in concept it is

clear that a single state could take a provocative foreign act unapproved by
Washington and for which the whole country would pay dearly.
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Research Center (IRRC) in Washington D.C., may present Due
Process problems and leave business entities without fair redress.
In Fuentes v. Shevin, 122 the Supreme Court emphasized that

"the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:
'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified. '- 1 2 3 The Court continued that "[tihe purpose of this

requirement is not only to ensure fair play to the individual. Its
purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of
property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively
unfair or mistaken deprivations .... ,,124
As discussed above, 125 the local measures are ambiguous as
to the quantum of business in Burma that will place companies
on a blacklist. Nor is it clear how the IRRC, a private group,
arrives at the criteria it uses in compiling its list. As in Eubank v.
Richmond,126 in which the Court invalidated an ordinance under
which certain property owners could decide the rights of others
without a clear definition of their terms of reference, a municipal
ordinance which "confer[s] the power on some property holders to
virtually control and dispose of the proper [sic] rights of others [is
unconstitutional because it] creates no standard by which the
power thus given is to be exercised." 12 7 A delegation of power
uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative
action, and with no provision for review, is "repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'128
While
delegation of fact-finding to a private consultant is not
problematic per se, it becomes problematic where the facts create
an inference that the local government functions as "simply a
rubber stamp' for the decisions of the outside entity. 12 9 Such a

122.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
123. Id. at 80 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 80-81.
125.
See supra note 22.
126.
Eubankv. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
127. Id. at 143-44.
128.
Washington v. Roberge ex rel. Seattle Trust Co., 278 U.S. 116, 122
(1928); see also Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396 (1926).

129.

Schulz v. Milne, 849 F. Supp. 708, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also Save

Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1983). This is true too, for
instance, in Massachusetts. which delegates the decision as to who is doing
business in Burma to the IRRC. "'It is well established in this commonwealth and
elsewhere that the Legislature cannot delegate the general power to make laws,

conferred upon it by a constitution like that of Massachusetts.'" Corning Glass
Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 361-62 (Mass. 1973) (citations
omitted). "One of the exceptions to or qualifications of the nondelegation doctrine
is that 'the Legislature may delegate to a board or an individual officer the
working out of the details of a policy adopted by the Legislature.'" Id. (citations
omitted). The court found, indeed, that the delegation under scrutiny failed to
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determination would be a question of fact. 130 It is unclear as a
matter of practice what, if any, scrutiny or review Massachusetts
or the local municipalities perform of the IRRC, its processes, its
criteria for inclusion, or its decisions as it wields the considerable
power delegated to it.
A matter, similar to the one here, was before a Maryland
court in a very similar context in Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor of
Baltimore.'3 '
In that case, the Trustees of the Employees'
Retirement System of Baltimore challenged a municipal ordinance
that required divestment of the city's three pension funds from
companies doing business in or with South Africa.
The
ordinance, moreover, delegated the determination as to who was
doing business in or with South Africa to an entity called the
Africa Fund.
The Maryland court did not find impermissible delegation in

this scheme largely due to the principle that a court should,
whenever possible, interpret a statute in a manner upholding its

constitutionality. 1 3 2 The ordinance's use of the word "reference"
in regard to the Africa Fund's Unified List, the court said, was

reasonably subject to the construction that the list did not in fact
bind the trustees. If it had bound the trustees, the delegation
would have violated the Maryland constitution. As one of several
commentators criticizing the decision has said:
It stands to reason, however, that the court . . . should have
inquired into how the Africa Fund compiles and annotates the
[Africa Fund's] Unified List and, finally, into how the Trustees
employ it . . . [and] to demonstrate that they acted with some
degree of independence in making divestment decisions as
evidence of the nonbinding effect of the Unified List.

The issue is of great importance because the Africa Fund could be
thrust into a position of great power, depending on the number of
state or local governments that rely upon the Unified List. The
incorporate the essential safeguards. The delegation contained "no provision for
participation by any public board or officer in the process.., nor for any policy or
standard to govern [its decision making], nor for notice, hearing or judicial review
of [the decision made]." Id. at 362; see also DiLoreto v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
418 N.E.2d 612, 614-15 (Mass. 1981) ("The Legislature may . . . delegate
authority to a private person in order that he may fulfill duties which are public in
nature ... so long as proper safeguards are provided."). Where a delegation is to
an entity that is "impartial and has no personal or private interest in the dispute.
. . [which] must follow detailed procedures and is bound to apply the statutory
standards," the delegation is not improper. Town of Arlington v. Board of
Conciliation & Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Mass. 1976).
130. See, e.g., Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil & Gas, 792 F.2d
782 (9th Cir. 1986).
131.
Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72 (1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).

132.

Id. at 97-98.
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Africa Fund's decisions- can indirectly but decisively affect South
Africa's population and government, scores of owners and
employees of America's corporations, and millions of pension fund
beneficiaries. It is not in the best interest of pension beneficiaries
to remain wedded to this or any other organization ....133

The question is one of process and of fact. While several of
the ordinances contain language suggesting that they do not
simply "rubber stamp" the IRRC's findings, it would be important
to establish that this is in fact so. It is also important to ensure
that the other safeguards the courts have emphasized are indeed
present in a process conducted almost entirely outside public
scrutiny.

IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY PARALLEL FOREIGN POLICIES

A. The FederalGovernment has Acted on the Matter and yet its
ConsideredDecision is not the Law of the Land
The local enactments under scrutiny here have had an effect.
Apple
Computer, Philips
Electronics,
Amoco,
Columbia
Sportswear, Carlsberg, Levi Strauss, Liz Claiborne, and Spiegel's
Eddie Bauer "have already left Burma.
There is a steadily
growing number of companies that have evaluated the business
opportunities in Burma, and have decided that it makes more
sense to leave rather than face consumer boycotts of penalties
13 4
from selective purchasing laws."
Yet this is not the law of the nation, nor the approach
Congress has chosen after deliberation. Whether future events
prove Congress' judgment to be right or wrong remains to be
seen. It is, however, undeniably Congress' policy that the threat
of sanctions should be the President's to deploy, and that even if
such sanctions are imposed, they should not be so broad as to
135
jeopardize the long term interests of U.S. businesses.
Economic sanctions, involving various issues such as against

133.

Smith, supra note 7, at 1041-42.

134.

INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER. MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS IN

BURMA (MYANMAR) iii
(1996).

135. The definition of "new investment" in the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriation Act specifically would not preclude U.S. companies from selling
their products in Burma, or buying from Burmese sources.
Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
The importance of product and name recognition, market share and penetration,
and the acquisition of contacts, infrastructure and experience In what may be in
the future a significant market are acknowledged in the federal legislation and
sacrificed to ideology in the local enactments. See Id.

19971 UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING BUSINESS TIES WITH BURMA203

whom, when, and how broadly to deploy them, have become
important tools of U.S. foreign policy. The actions of state and
municipal governments designed specifically to influence foreign
nations provides a clear example of the136nation's failure to "speak
with one voice" on international issues.
While a particular locality may succeed in pressing a
corporation to withdraw from Burma so as to be eligible for that
locality's business, such action may undermine efforts at the
to
assist
U.S.
businesses
to
compete
federal
level
internationally, 1 3 7 may limit the President's 'ability to choose
between a range of policy options, 13 8 and may restrict the federal
government from responding to positive changes such as a
commitment to start a dialogue with the democratic opposition.
In striking their own balance between pragmatism and principle

136. As the Deputy Secretary of State said in response to a question about
divestment during a similar debate on South Africa:

Disinvestment would signal a U.S. unwillingness to pursue the only logical
course of action open to us, which is attempting to promote peaceful
change in South Africa. Withdrawal of U.S. business interests would
remove one of the few tools of influence available to us in helping to
promote change and would leave a moral void that would result in a
lessening of both regional U.S. influence and our ability to influence
movement away from apartheid.

Spiro, supra note 6, at 828 n.96 (response of Dep. Sec. of State Kenneth Dam to
question of Sen. Heinz.).
137.
"The Clinton administration has so far resisted [debarment], saying
that it wouldn't be effective and that Asian-led projects would replace American

investment." Matt Miller, Pipeline of Controversy: Unocal Called to Court by
Opponents of Burma Regime, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE. Nov. 10, 1996, at II.
Japanese businesses that are aggressively entering Burma include Nissan
Motor Company, Mitsubishi Motors, Mitsui Engineering and Ship Building,
Marubeni (which is involved in a variety of other projects such as building an
airport to developing the teak trade), Sumitomo, Itochu Corp, Daiwan Research
Institute, an affiliate of Daiwan Bank which is helping to set up Burma's stock
exchange), Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nippon Steel
Corp, Komatsu. and'others. Burma: JapanSees Rich Pickings'inBurma, BUSINESS
VIETNAM, Aug. 1,1996.
Whether the federal policy is right or wrong, it is clear from the Congressional
debate that federal lawmakers were concerned that withdrawal of the few U.S.
companies present in Burma would do little to change SLORC's politics and
would simply leave a void which other countries' businesses would fill. An
example of this would be the aftermath of Dutch pressure on Amsterdam-based
Heinicken to leave Burma. Acceding to the pressure, Heinicken sold its stake in a
half completed brewery in Burma to Fraser and Neave of Singapore. "The
Singaporean group buying out the Dutch will simply market beer under its Tiger
brand instead." Ted Bardacke, Western Companies Encounter Protesters on Road
to Burma, FINANCIALTIMES, July 12, 1996, at 3.
138. There is already federal legislation pertaining to Burma which the local
enactments neither acknowledge nor purport to work in tandem. See H.R. Con.
Res. 188, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (describing such legislation and its
effects).
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and diminishing to some extent U.S. global presence, localities
may be sacrificing U.S. jobs in areas where the anti-Burma
initiatives are not law.
Finally, the constitutional system has no mechanism to
ensure that the state and federal governments respond uniformly
to changes in the circumstances that led to the adoption of
measures aimed at foreign nations. 13 9 One commentator notes
that in 1991 the United States softened sanctions on South Africa
to encourage President de Klerks's reforms, but that only one of
the 140 local laws, which were mostly far broader than the federal
law, was repealed. "This has raised fundamental questions about
the United States' basic policy toward South Africa and the
reforms of the minority white government.' 140
B. State and Local Governments Are InappropriateBodiesfor
ForeignPolicymaking
There are at least three major problems with local
governments in the United States purporting to make and
implement the nation's foreign policy.
First, the United States is a large and diverse nation in which
carrying parochial concerns to the international stage could have
repercussions well beyond the localities themselves. No harm is
done when Boston's large population of Irish politicians gathers to
sing Irish songs on St. Patrick's day; there may be harm done,
however, if Boston is allowed to instigate a skirmish with the
United Kingdom over Northern Ireland in which the rest of the
country is not inclined to participate. 14 1 Nor is the local slant

139. Dean Fenton points to a federal anti-apartheid law passed in 1986 (the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5001-17 (West Supp. 1991))
which came into existence at a time when over 100 local jurisdictions had
adopted some form of divestment or contract debarment laws. Many of these
laws were aimed at forcing companies to completely disengage, while the federal
law sought to use the presence of U.S. firms as leverage for change. When
President Bush exercised his option under the Act and ended most sanctions,
only one state repealed its divestment law and the situation was one in which
there were then minimal federal restrictions with extensive state and local
restrictions, with significant cumulative effect. Fenton, supra note 6, at 577-78.
140. Id. at 564.
141. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 7, 22C(a) (West Supp. 1996) in effect prohibits state
agencies from procuring goods or services from businesses that supply any
equipment used for military purposes by the British army, and MASS. GEN. L. ch.
32, 23(1)(d)(iii) (West. Supp. 1986) bans pension funds from investing in financial
institutions which have loans outstanding to businesses selling military
equipment for use by the British army. The British government's reaction,
predictably, has been to express considerable irritation. See, e.g., BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 5.1983, at 68.
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only geopolitical. 14 2
Although vigorous local input is both
protected and beneficial in the debate that precedes the crafting
of foreign policy, it would seem particularly unwise to have
parochial concerns interposed in the implementation of a national
foreign policy.
Second, U.S. foreign policy is informed by organizations and
intelligence networks that, flawed or not, are instrumentalities
designed for that particular purpose. Local actions may be
intemperate and not informed by larger, national policy issues.
At least one federal court took a dim view of retaliation as
mounted by the State University of New Mexico against Iran
during the embassy hostage crisis where the university denied
admission to students whose home government held or permitted

the holding of U.S. citizens as hostages.'

43

In disallowing the

retaliatory measure, the Court stated that "sensitive judgments"
in foreign affairs should not be made by those lacking expertise
and information in foreign policy.
In the Burma context, the issue of whether engagement or
divestment is a better impetus for change is unclear and was
much debated at the federal level, and references to the success
of similar business retaliation in the context of South Africa may
be inapposite.
As several senators noted, there are major
differences between the two foreign policy problems. First, Burma
is surrounded by countries that by and large either ignore or
easily tolerate its regime; South Africa had only hostile
neighbors.144 Second, South Africa had an economy intertwined

142.
Tom Ammiano, the San Francisco Supervisor who was a leading figure
in getting that city to adopt its boycott, is quoted as having argued in its support,
"They put people under house arrest ....
If you're HIV-positive, they shoot you
on the spot." Goldberg, 911 Radio Bidders, supra note 99. Since Burma has
approximately between 150,000 and 450,000 reported cases of HIV infection, the
proposition is unlikely to be true. See, e.g, Philip Shenon, AIDS Cuts Wide Swath
In Vulnerable Burma, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 1994, at 19.
143.
Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1379 (1980).
144.
First, let me say Burma is not South Africa. Back in the 1970's
and 1980's, the oppressive nature of the apartheid regime . . . led the
Senate to impose heavy sanctions and isolation to end the regime. In
order to do that, we had the support of not only our Western European
allies but of the front-line nations, those surrounding South Africa, who
also lent their support and joined in the effort to bring down apartheid.
Unlike South Africa in the 1970's and 1980's. Burma is not
surrounded by nations ready to shun it. As a matter of fact, Burma's
neighbors and other states in the region reject the view that isolating
Burma is the best means to encourage change. They are pursuing trade
and engagement, and will do so regardless of what we do or say. Those

nations over there who are closest and in closest proximity are
maintaining their relations with Burma, seeking to bring about change
over a period of time. Isolating Burma is simply not going to work, and we
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with the rest of the world: "The scope of companies [with South
African ties] is immense. They are among the nation's biggest and
most prestigious, with a total stock value of $600 billion,
representing half the capitalization of the Standard and Poor's
500 Index.' 145 Burma, after years of isolation, does not have the
146
sort of economy- that a U.S. withdrawal is likely to damage.
Third, South Africa's oligarchy, its white middle class, benefitted
from foreign engagement and suffered at divestment from the
collapsing Rand, from deteriorating standards of living, and from
the sense of international castigation that resulted. Burma has
no appreciable middle class, nor is it clear who sanctions will hurt
since the withdrawal of U.S. investment is unlikely to result in a
vacuum. 1 4 7 There was also a measure of consensus about South
Africa because of the sensitive issue of race in the United

States. 4 8 Burma, on the other hand, is much less reported and
the issues that confront that country are less well known.
Finally, as a practical matter, these local measures may be
difficult for business entities to follow, let alone comply with. As
noted above, several measures are ambiguous and not readily
susceptible of clear and reasonably uniform interpretation. 14 9 For
instance, in Berkeley's statute, "willingness" alone to do business
in Burma is grounds for debarment, as is "assisting" someone to
will not have the support of our allies. We will not have the support of our
Asian friends.
142 CONG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
145. Anise C. Wallace, Wall St. Feels the Heat from Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1985, at Flo.
146.
First, United States policy toward South Africa was coordinated
with our allies and that nation's most important trading partners. It was
multilateral. There was no serious prospect that when our companies
pulled out of the South African economy others would readily take their
place, thereby undermining the effect of sanctions and making their chief
victim American companies. Second, South Africa was much richer than
Burma is today. Per capita income in South Africa was $2,000 when we
imposed sanctions. In Burma today it is $200, one of the lowest rates in
the world. South Africa had a stake in the world economy. Burma has
just begun to develop an interest in attracting foreign trade and
investment. Third, Burma is an overwhelmingly rural economy, with
manufacturing accounting for 9.4 percent of GDP and 8.2 percent of
employment.
Fourth, the South African regime and the elite that
supported it had historical connections to the nations censuring it. It was
not only affected materially by the sanctions imposed on it, but many in
South Africa who treasured their ties to the West were dismayed by their
international isolation.
Burma has a long history of self-imposed isolation.

142 CONG. REc. S8754 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. McCaln).
147.
148.
149.

Id.; see also supra note 137.
See, e.g.. Spiro, supra note 6, at 815 n.16.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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do business there. In trying to get a city contract in San
Francisco, Ericsson GE was disqualified due to the activities of a
related entity in Europe over which it had no control. "Ericsson
GE denies doing business in Burma. 'It's our parent company,
Ericsson LM in Sweden, that's doing business there,"' a
spokesman for Ericsson GE is reported to have said. 150
The prohibited quantum of business involvement in Burma is
phrased differently in different locations. A business entity
considering a venture abroad, or without control over a subsidiary
or affiliate with majority foreign ownership, could be at a loss as
to whether it is the foreign policy of a city in North Carolina or
that of the federal government that governs foreign commerce.

V.

CONCLUSION

A unilateral U.S. boycott of Burma is unlikely to have much
impact on Burma for the same reason that the local anti-Burma

The few U.S.
enactments are likely to go unchallenged.
businesses that remain in Burma are unlikely to have much
interest in mounting a constitutional challenge to a grassroots
Such reluctance,
and superficially reasonable movement.
however, does not mean that the enactments are constitutional,
or that the process they betoken is wise. Indeed, the Burma
situation may be one of those circumstances about which it is
aptly noted that hard cases make bad law.

150.

Goldberg, 911 Radio Bidders, supra note 100.

